the space shuttle flight control system called pass

The grey-colored RCC panels lining the leading edges of the wings can clearly be seen, but the impact location is out of sight. Pictured from Columbia’s aft flight deck, this view shows the payload bay and Spacehab research double module. On 31 January, the day before Columbia was due to land, engineer Kevin McCluney offered a hypothetical description to his colleagues at the Johnson Space Center’s (JSC) flight control team of the kind of data “signature” they could expect to receive in the event that the worst should happen. This did not, however, prevent an analysis of a possible scenario in which the RCC had been breached. Senior managers doubted that a foam strike-an event which had occurred on earlier missions-could possibly be a “safety of flight” issue. If it was the latter, this did not bode well for Columbia’s re-entry, for the panels helped to guard the vehicle against the brunt of 3,000-degree-Celsius (5,400-degree-Fahrenheit) extremes during the hypersonic return to Earth. It was unclear if these particles originated from the impact of the foam itself or from shattered pieces of the RCC panels. The video footage from STS-107’s launch on 16 January offered little indication of what, if any, damage the foam strike had caused, save for a huge shower of particles. It would prove to be a dismissal as ill-judged as declaring the Titanic to be unsinkable.ĭebris falls from the External Tank (ET) to hit Columbia’s wing, about 82 seconds after launch. And when a briefcase-sized chunk of insulating foam was spotted on the STS-107 launch video falling from the External Tank (ET) at T+82 seconds and hitting Columbia’s left wing-at precisely the spot where Reinforced Carbon Carbon (RCC) would later guard the ship against the most severe re-entry temperatures-concern was elevated, but ultimately dismissed. In over two decades of operational services, the fleet had weathered last-second shutdowns on the launch pad, main engine problems during ascent and severe Thermal Protection System (TPS) damage during re-entry.

Those shortcomings came home to roost with horrifying suddenness on the morning of 1 February 2003. The shuttle remained an inherently dangerous vehicle, although the robustness of the four surviving orbiters-Discovery, Atlantis, Columbia herself and the “baby” of the fleet, Endeavour-had been amply demonstrated and their shortcomings were well-understood.

Video Credit: Discovery Channel, via timecapsule80s/YouTube

The space shuttle flight control system called pass